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THE RIDDLE OF LEGAL INSANITY
Thomas J. Meyers
The author is a member of the psychiatric panel, Superior Court of Los Angeles,
and Director of Meyers Clinic, Los Angeles. He is Professor of Psychiatry in the
College of Osteopathic Physicians and Surgeons, and a practicing psychiatrist in
Pasadena.
This article should be enlightening to those who are puzzled by seemingly con-
tradictory testimony offered by psychiatrists.-EnTOR.
On November Eleventh, 1952, an event occurred which is outstanding
in our time in the field of criminology. On invitation from the Hacker
Foundation of Beverly Hills a discussion seminar on the topic of "Crim-
inal Responsibility" was held in the Hacker Clinic in Beverly Hills. The
study presented by Dr. Marcel Frym was in itself a notable offering, but
the circumstance making this event so unusual was that here in one
place were gathered the essential personnel responsible for the adminis-
tration of criminal justice in Los Angeles County. The approximately
one hundred persons in attendance included judges from the criminal
bench of the Superior Court, judges from the criminal division of
the Municipal Courts, representatives of the district attorney's office,
the public defender's office, court clerks, probation officers, social
workers, members of the psychiatrists' panel of the Superior Court,
psychologists and clergy working in the jails. In addition there
were attorneys and some interested laymen. The panel itself was sig-
nificant for it consisted of two superior court judges of the criminal
division, a deputy district attorney, the professor of criminology of the
U.C.L.A. Law School, the Dean of the School of Law at U.S.C., a
Catholic priest working with the courts and in the jails, and the modera-
tor was a member of the psychiatrists' panel. Seldom was such an im-
pressive and authoritative gathering available to discuss such a wavering
question as the matter of criminal responsibility.
The high point of the presentations and discussion was a question
raised from the floor by a Judge of the Municipal Court of Los Angeles.
He cited an instance in which there was brought before him a young man,
a student of psychology, charged with a serious sexual offense. He
considered the matter one of potential social hazard and signed the case
over to the Superior Court for consideration of the matter of sexual
psychopathy. Three eminent psychiatrists examined the young man.
One reported him to be a dangerous sexual psychopath, a menace to
society, and recommended confinement. The other two experts reported
that he was not a psychopath, implying that he operated within the
normal limits of human behavior. The judge was confused by this
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divergence of opinion in a case that appeared to him to be so obvious,
and he asked, with a note of criticism, why there should be such a differ-
ence in the appraisal of common clinical data by men who were capable.
Here in a few words is the kernel of this problem that has been posed
for a hundred years or more, and apparently we are only slightly closer
to an answer today than in the days of the McNaghten rule.
It does not satisfy anyone's enquiry to cite the split votes of the
Supreme Court in interpretations of a written document, the constitu-
tion, for it is well recognized that, like politicians, Supreme Court
justices are classed as liberal or conservative, or frankly as Democratic
or Republican, and their decisions are often colored by these affiliations.
But doctors are close to the field of science and 'the examination of
humans is supposed to be factual. Why, it might be asked, do scientists
vary so radically in the interpretation of similar data? Is the field of
psychiatry an art, a philosophy, or a science? It is evident that in foren-
sic psychiatry, at least, the label Of science is misplaced, for here there
is predominantly theory and philosophy about which there is much
difference of opinion. In the 'matter of criminal responsibility where the
psychiatrist is called upon to render an opinion, he is not required to be
factual; he is asked, rather, for his opinion of the case in terms of the
facts available. If he chooses to place only a relative evaluation on the
different facts, his opinion stands staunchly just the same. There is
such a strong personal element in psychiatric opinion that on some occa-
si'ons even prejudice enters into its formation. However, the matter is
not so simple, for if we consider the factors involved and the wide
semantic range in the use of terms employed by the different professions
having to do with this matter, it takes on increasing complexity.
ORGANICISTS
The field of psychiatry is composed of three major groups of psy-
chiatrists. These men are all'physicians, duly recognized and approved.
The largest, and by far the dominant group in American psychiatric
circles, as well as in other parts of the world, are the organicists. These
are specialists in the study and treatment of mental illness who view
their -patients in terms of anatomy, physiology, and pathology. They
are the strict followers of the American medical tradition, stemming
from William Osler, which contends that disease must be based solidly
on pathology to justify its existence. The principles of this group are
ably outlined in the book by Stanley Cobb.' In this same vein is Tred-




gold's recent book2 which accomplishes the phenomenal feat of discus-
sing the field of psychiatry and ignoring practically all the advances in
dynamic psychopathology of the past fifty years. This group may be
divided still further into what might be termed "hard shell" and others
who show a little inclination to recognize some of the instruments out-
side of the world of neurology. The more extreme organaicists number
among them neurosurgeons, neurologists, neurophysiologists and even re-
search workers to whom there has been assigned the task of examining
mental patients. The majority of them, however, are practical, hard-
headed clinicians who base their conclusion upon demonstrable clinical
data. They tend to wave aside conjectural symbolisms and refuse to
accept dynamisms as explanatory of behavior. The organicistic outlook
is toward precision in diagnosis, but negative as to prognosis. This ex-
plains their tendency to recommend "life imprisonment for sexual of-
fenders ' 3 for they are a social hazard and nothing can be done for them.
The organicistic opinion of legal insanity is restricted to frank psychoses
in the Kraepelinian sense, where the individual is so confused or de-
mented that obviously he was unable to discern right from wrong-or
anything else. If all court psychiatrists were members of this group the
controversy now waging would be greatly lessened.
A great many institutional psychiatrists are organicists and deal mostly
with psychotic cases. They are a badly overworked group and often to
their dismay find that their time is taken up by administrative detail
rather than actual work with patients. Still another segment of this
large proportion of our specialists are men who have grown up with the
specialty and carry with them impressions of their earlier experiences.
They too do not give much credence to the newer trends, preferring to
stay with their tried and more familiar procedures. In many instances
the examination of prisoners or defendants before the court is a task
added to an already redundant schedule of a busy psychiatrist. Fre-
quently the time available to make the necessary examination is all too
short. Experience in the last war when psychiatric appraisals were made
on a mass basis has made some examiners defend the brief procedure.
2. TREDGOLD, A. F. MANUAL OF PSYCHOLOGICAL MEDICINE. Baltimore: Williams & Wil-
kins, 1943, xi ± 298, who states ". . . while diagnosis is a matter of opinion, it must not
be assumed that this is therefore subjective and intuitive." This is not greatly different from
MEYNERT, THEODOR. PSYCHIATRY, A CLINICAL TREATISE ON DISEASES OF THE FORE BRAIN.
New York: G. P. Putnam & Sons, 1385, which frankly discusses mental changes in terms of
the anatomy of the brain.
3. In a wave of public indignation over the matter of sex crimes in Los Angeles in 1950
a number of psychiatrists testified before an investigating assembly committee expressing
this view.
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Most examiners,however, will acknowledge that the more information
available, the more definite the c6nclusions can be.
Indicative of the strong organic flavor in American psychiatry is the
general set up of examinations given by the specialty boards certifying
psychiatrists. Every candidate must, pass highly technical examinations
in neuroanatomy, neurophysiology, neuropathology and neuroroent-
geneology. This same state of affairs is showing itself in the proposed
bill dealing with the licensing of clinical psychologists.4
PSYCHOANALYSTS
The next group of specialists in American psychiatry, holding posi-
ticns of authority and recognition equal to those held by organicists, are
much smaller numerically, but obviously more vociferous. They occupy
a position at the opposite pole from the organicists. In the extreme
they concentrate on the psychic with sparse attention to the physical.
They are the psychoanalytically oriented psychiatrists. They are highly
trained with a heavy emphasis upon psychoanalytic theory and tech-
niques. They are generally a very positive group and give the impres-
sion that they have the answers. Many analysts are impatient and a
little intolerant of others who do not hold the same views as they. They
frequently state with authoritative certainty the origin and basis of
behavior problems in terms of complicated intrapsychic dyhamisms. An
example of this is the following analysis of a case of alcoholism:
"Dynamically he went through a strictly regulated childhood, but because of the
home situation he incorporated super-ego and ego-ideals of maternal rather than
paternal derivation. Thus while still not having solved the oedipal conflict, but
also while having derived a maternal super-ego, he becomes especially ambivalent
toward his super-ego. Then in adolescence he reacts with compensatory oral aggres-
siveness, but begins to use alcohol on the one hand to support his oral dependency,
and on the other hand to blur his sense of guilt over aggression and bolster a
feeling of self-confidence which h never had, through a failure of paternal identifi-
cation."
The psychoanalyst will comprehend this and have a semantic affinity
with it, but the organicist will place his own evaluation and interpreta-
tion upon it. This is only reasonable, for one would expect the analyst
who has lived and studied his concept, almost to the exclusion of other
subjects, for five to ten years to place a greater meaning and signifi-
cance upon the intrapsychic life of his patients than the organicists
4. Wherever collaboration between psychologists and medical men is resorted to to pro-
vide licensing legislation, the requirement of a knowledge of the basic sciences is included.
This means subjects not ordinarily part of a psychologist's training, such as anatomy, physi-
ology, chemistry, and pathology.
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whose understanding of which in many instances is didactic and literary. "
When these matters are discussed and the various terms are bantered
back and forth, expressions are used that are part of the vocabularies of
each, and yet for each the meanings vary. A behavior problem then
presents certain clinical data which is elicited on one occasion by an
organicist and the same data at a later time by an analyst, and yet in
each instance the picture is different. The problem that is to the or-
ganicist hopeless and an incorrigible social hazard, to the analyst is a
clinical case with a very good prognosis. The two groups of psychiatrists
see the same case through radically different perspectives. Although both
use the same terms and presumably the same language, they are thinking
different things and have different impressions when they do. The basic
precepts of the psychoanalytic group are clearly elaborated by Fenichel.
Fundamental differences between them and the organicists are nicely dis-
played in the debate carried on between Ben Karpman and the late
Abraham Myerson. 7 Another example is the fact that organicists, prac-
ticing as physicians, as they must to carry out their work, must be li-
censed, whereas, psychoanalysts are able to conduct a busy and lucrative
practice without the necessity of a license, because in the strict interpre-
tation of the law they are not practicing medicine. Freud himself wrote
a treatise advocating the training of lay-analysts.8  Psychoanalytically
oriented psychiatrists occupy positions of ethical responsibility and do
serve the courts as experts and a majority of them are licensed physicians,
but idealogically and philosophically they differ widely from the organ-
ically trained psychiatrist.
The complexity of this matter is increased by the fact that the psycho-
analysts are divided among themselves into "Orthodox Freudians",
"Neo Fruedians", Jungians or followers of Carl Jung, individual psy-
5. BENJAMIN KARPMAN in PSYCHOGENIC ASPECTS OF HEADACHE. A Symposium, J. Clin.
Psychopath., 10, 8, 194-9, states, "when an individual takes food against his will or he wants
to express a reaction against the environment, his vegetative nervous system, in response to
the emotional stimulus, makes the food come out in the form of vomiting. While il [ihe
physical sense this is vomiting, in a psychic sense it means rejection." It is clear that when
the organicist speaks of rejection in this sense, he is really quoting the dynamicist, but at the
same time his thought and meaning are of the physical mechanism of vomiting in terms of
a physical stimulus, environmentally determined. In one case the cause is sought in the
immediate situation, in the other in the developmental past of the individual.
6. FENICHAL, OTTO. THE PSYCHOANALYTIC THEORY OF NEUROSIS. New York: Norton,
1945, x - 703.
7. QUART. REV. PSYCH. & NEUR. 1948, 3, 379 and ibid, 1947, 4, 553-77. Myersotn states
"I object to the presumption by Dr. Karpman that Freudian psychiatry is the only dynamic
psychiatry."
8. FREUD, SIGMUND. THE QUESTION OF LAY ANALYSIS. New York: Norton, 1950, p. 125,
who states, "In Germany and America . . . every patient may be treated how and by whom
he will, and any quack may set up to treat whatever type of patient he prefers, provided he
assumes responsibility for what he does. The law does not intervene unless and until it is
involved in respect to damages incurred in the treatment."
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chologists or followers of Alfred Adler, Wilhelm Reichians, and also
Theodore Reikians, those who adhere to the teachings of Otto Rank, W.
Stekel and even Freudian disciples such as S. Ferenczi and Ernest Jones
add some notes of their own that are perpetuated by their pupils. Each
of these practitioners colors his conclusions a little differently than
those of other schools, and the particular tenet or theory followed in-
fluences to a relative degree the semantics of the terms commonly used
by all psychiatrists. This in turn definitely determines the conclusions
and recommendations which such an examiner will make on the behavior
problem he is studying.
What the psychoanalytic psychiatrists lack in number they make up
in the volume of their writings. They are prolific writers and flood-the
literature; so much so that practically all psychiatric texts have some
flavoring of psychoanalytic concepts. Many psychoanalytic terms have
become common property of the whole field of psychiatry. Such terms
as '"conversion", "complex", "psychic conflict", "unconscious'', etc. which
are common almost every day lay terms stem from psychoanalytic pro-
ductions. However, it is well to remember that the readers of these
terms do not always understand them in the exact sense or in respect to
the broad implications of the writer.
PSYCHOBIOLOGISTS
There is a third group of American psychiatrists, equally ethical and
accepted and holding a status as respected as the two foregoing groups.
These represent a newer addition to the specialty, and in a way have
been specifically trained for it. They are the psychologically oriented
psychiatrists and are most characteristically- represented by the psycho-
biologists of Adolf Meyer. 9 They are the most pragmatic and least
dogmatized of all; for they do not espouse any particular school, nor are
they loathe to use the developments in the realm of psychology.'0 Other
individuals who probably fit into this category are graduates of the
Washington School of Psychiatry, followers of the principles of Harry
Stack Sullivan, men coming out of the Menninger Clinic and the osteo-
9. The principles of Adolf Meyer are expressed clearly in his own words, "One of the
most important lessons of modern psychiatry is the absolute necessity of going beyond the
asylum walls and of working where things have their beginning; and experience shows that
there only organized cooperation will achieve success. . . . But the dogma of perfect mental
activity and diseases merely of the brain has led to a multitude of assumptions of brain
anatomy and brain physiology which cannot stand the test of critical experimentation."
COMMONSENSE PSYCHIATRY OF DR. ADOLF MEYER. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1948, p. 293.
10. ELIASBERG, WLADIMIR in Psychopathy or Neurosis. In Expert's Opinion, J. CLIN.
PSYCHOPATH., 1946, 8, 275, states "The Projective Methods, Among them Rorschach and
graphology may prove useful in every case. The final diagnosis, however, belongs to the
clinician because the most important method is still the clinical analysis of the case at hand."
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pathic psychiatrists. I tere, however, a distinct flavor identifies each and
conditions to some degree the opinions expressed. The basis of this
category of specialists is outlined in some detail by Yacorzinski.1
Psychologically oriented psychiatrists are physicians using the ma-
terial of psychiatry and psychology. They are indoctrinated into the
clinical practices of both fields and have acquired a familiarity with the
tools and techniques of each. They are, however, conscious of the in-
diVidual as a medical problem and are eclectic in meeting his needs.
They utilize consultants from other specialties to identify and evaluate
all behavioral manifestations and work closely with them, very much
as the organicist does. They utilize, however, a psychodynamic approach
to the understanding of their cases and plan the outcome of their work
in terms of the dynamic mechanisms. They in contrast to organicists
rely to a great extent, upon psychotherapy for the treatment of their
patients. In contrast to psychoanalysts they regard their patients as
psychobiologic units and not as psychic projections. Their interpretation
o'f their examination data is couched in terms used also by the other cate-
gories of psychiatrists, but they have meanings and a significance peculiar
to them.
As if the complexity of the problem were not great enough with this
wide divergence of viewpoint, still another subdivision of psychiatric
examiners must be made. There are, for example, those psychiatrists
who make their tests and render their reports as doctors, but there are
also those, who from long experience in the courts, with attorneys, or
from some secret longing, try to be attorneys. These examiners use
procedures common to attorneys and appear to be eliciting evidence
rather than a case history. They will frequently quote questions and
answers verbatim-as if it were a deposition, with the intent in mind of
proving by the statements of the patient that their conclusion is true.'-
This is far from the task of the physician-psychiatrist who very fre-
quently must deduce the facts from statements that fail to elucidate.
What the patient says is poor evidence from a medical standpoint; it
is good only when a legal point is being made by a lawyer.
It is a common experience for examiners to find that the story told by
a defendant varies considerably from that told to a probation officer, or
11. YACOaZINsKi, G. K. MEDICAL PSYCHOLOGY. New York: The Roland Press, 1951,
xviii + 535.
12. This is a problem closely related to the matter of cohfessions about which there is
some difference of opinion among legal authorities. For example CHARLES T. MCCORMICK
in Some Problems and Developments in the Admissibility of Confessions, J. CLIN. PSYCHO-
PATH., 1946, 8, 193, states, ". . in most American courts, hardened into a rigid rule based
upon the premise that confessions generally are an unreliable class of evidence."
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even a signed confession at the time of arrest. It is the examiner's task,
not to challenge the veracity of his examinee, but to enquire as to why.
Most examiners have found that with the establishment of rapport
with the defendant a markedly improved narrative is elicited. If the
psychiatrist were able only to form .his opinions upon the narrative of
the defendant, he would frequently become a dupe. As we know, that
is not the case, for examiners form opinions and come to conclusions
that very often are at variance with the defendant's statements. To
present data in the form of a deposition possibly is intended to make it
easier for the attorneys and judges, who will read it, to understand the
data. This is hardly necessary and it is questionable if it attains that
objective. It is almost a predigestion of the psychiatrist's thinking of
thd case. Another effect of this method of reporting is that, being in
legal form (some psychiatrists even use legal forms with their names
printed upon them, much in the manner usual with attorneys), it is a
matter of consistency for the attorney to read the terms in light of his
legal understanding, and a new semantic complication enters into the
evaluation of legal insanity. This is further emphasized by the tendency
of some psychiatrists to quote the law, but here "a little knowledge is
a dangerous thing," for without a thorough indoctrination int6 legal
theory and some guidance in the complicated maze of the workings of
law, an innocent quotation may change the meaning, to an attorney, of
the whole report.
ADDITIONAL GROUPS
This matter could be carried further for in every instance where the
question of legal insanity is raised, not only are the psychiatrists, who
are the experts and determiners of the matter, involved, but also judges,
attorneys, both prosecutors and defense, court clerks, court reporters
who write the record of proceedings and often introduce the words that
comprise them, probation officers, the jurors who decide the case, the
religious worker interested in rehabilitation and even the bail bond agent
contributes to the matter in some way. However, to do so would extend
the scope of this study and make it a little cumbersome. It is hoped
that with an understanding of the variations in semantics a better
plane of action may be determined. It can be seen that only confusion
may be expected when the solution of a problem is attempted by a
number of solvers each on a different level and each speaking a different
language using the same symbols.
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